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WHEN

the Civil Aeronautics Act was enacted in 1938, numerous
other statutes related to air transportation were repealed or
amended by Section 1107 of that Act.' Among such amendments was
subsection (j):
"Section 203(b) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, is amended by
inserting after the words '(7) Motor vehicles used exclusively in
the distribution of newspapers' a semicolon and the following:
'or (7a) the transportationof persons or property by motor vehicle
when incidental to transportationby aircraft'."

The significance of this amendment is not apparent without reference to Section 203 (b) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (Part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act) .2 Section 203 (b) is the "exemption" section
which relieves the several types of motor carriers therein specified from
all provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act except those relative to
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety
of operation or standards of equipment. Thus, a motor carrier falling
within the exemption of Section 203 (b) is not subject to economic
regulation by the Commission, that is to say, such a motor carrier is
not required to procure a certificate of public convenience and necessity
or an operating permit from the Commission and its rates are not
subject to control by the Commission. The effect of Section 1107 (j) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act was thus to place in this exempt category
"the transportation of persons or property by motor vehicle when
incidental to transportation by aircraft."
The phrase "when incidental to transportation by aircraft" is not
defined, or otherwise qualified or explained, either in the Civil Aero1 52 Stat. 1027, 49 U.S.C. 677.
2

Part II, Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. 303.
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nautics Act or the Interstate Commerce Act, nor has diligent research
by numerous persons revealed any legislative history which might
throw light upon the Congressional intent with respect to the scope of
this phrase. Moreover, at the time Section 1107 (j) of the Civil Aeronautics Act was enacted, there was no comparable provision either in
that Act or in the Interstate Commerce Act from which the meaning
of that phrase could be construed by analogy. Thus, Congress in
effect employed a novel statutory expression without offering any clues
as to its precise meaning, notwithstanding the fact that an important
exemption was thereby created for a class of motor carriers of rapidly
increasing significance.
The purpose of Section 203 (b) (7a) is, of course, obvious. Air
transportation, unlike other forms of transportation, is seldom, if ever,
complete in and of itself. Other forms of transportation generally have
their terminals in the heart of the city or town served; but most airline
terminals, i.e., airports, are located at considerable distances from the
centers of the cities and towns which they are designed to serve. This
occurs not only because airports, particularly those accommodating the
larger commercial aircraft, require extensive tracts of land which can
only be procured at reasonable prices in rural or suburban areas, but
also because the inherent nature of commercial air transportation precludes frequent short interval stops by the airplanes, with the result
that airports are often so located as to serve with reasonable convenience several separate communities. Inevitable gaps are thus created
between the actual origin and destination points of air travelers and
air shipments and the places where the airplanes are available; and
motor carriers, operating either under contract with the airlines or
independently, are the usual means of filling these unavoidable gaps
in a complete air transportation service. Under Title IV of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, Congress gave to the Civil Aeronautics Board complete jurisdiction over all economic phases of common carrier air
transportation; but under Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act,
in the absence of the aforementioned amendment to Section 203
(b) (7a), the Commission retained jurisdiction over these "incidental"
motor carrier services so essential to a commercial air transportation
system. Congress apparently recognized the undesirability of this
duality of regulation and acted accordingly. Thus, as stated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board in a case involving this question: 3
"Section 1107 (j) amends the Motor Carrier Act to exclude
from the regulatory provisions of that Act motor vehicle operations
which are 'incidental to transportation by aircraft.' It is apparent
that it was deemed necessary to avoid conflict of jurisdiction between the Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission."
The general purpose of the exemption created by Section 203
(b) (7a) is thus clear enough, but the precise scope to be given that
exemption is far less certain. The exemption is, of course, a limitation
3 Railway Express Agency Grandfather Certificate, 2 CAB 531 at 538.
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on the scope of the Interstate Commerce Act, and as such, the primary
responsibility for the interpretation of such exemption rests with the
will not be disCommission; and such interpretation, if reasonable,
4
turbed by the Courts except for weighty reasons.
The applicability of the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a) has been
considered by the Commission in at least eighteen reported cases and
several unreported cases. These cases fall into the following three
distinct categories, each of which has been treated somewhat differently
by the Commission: (1) cases concerned with the air express traffic
of the Railway Express Agency, all of which were decided during the
period 1940-1942; (2) cases involving the transportation of commercial airline traffic by motor carriers operating under contracts with the
airlines, the first decision in this category having been made in 1947;
and (3) cases involving the transportation of commercial airline traffic
by motor carriers operating independently of the airlines, the initial
decision in this category also having been made in 1947.
1.

THE RAILWAY

ExPR.Ess

CASES

This discussion commences with the R.E.A. cases, not because they
are first in significance, but because they are first in time and have
thereby created an unnecessary amount of confused thinking. The
R.E.A. cases are, in fact, utterly without value as precedent for the
airline traffic cases, and in all probability may be regarded as over-ruled
by the Commission even with respect to R.E.A. traffic.
"Air Express" is an expedited service of the R.E.A. Air express
traffic moves on R.E.A. bills of lading and is accepted from shippers
and delivered to consignees only by the R.E.A. The commercial airlines are utilized by the R.E.A. under contract to move such traffic
between airports, but the R.E.A. is the carrier insofar as the public is
concerned. Air express traffic moves at substantially higher rates .than
"air freight" and is given a priority in handling by the airlines. When
air express moves by aircraft, it necessarily must be transported to or
from the airport by motor carrier. At some points such motor carrier
service is provided by the R.E.A. itself, while at other points the service
is provided by motor carriers under contract with the R.E.A.
In the first case involving Section 203 (b) (7a) 5 a motor carrier,
under contract with the R.E.A. to transport air express between Columbus and the airport serving Columbus (Port Columbus), applied
to the Commission for a contract carrier permit covering such operation. The Commission, without analyzing Section 203 (b) (7a), held
such service to be within the exemption and dismissed the application.
During the years 1941 and 1942 the Commission decided four cases
in which the R.E.A. applied for authority to transport express by its
4 Brewster v. Gage, 280 US 335 at 336.
5 Port Columbus Cab Co.-Contract CarrierApplication, 24 MCC 237.
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motor vehicles between points formerly served by railroads.' In each
of these cases the Commission found that the public convenience and
necessity required the proposed service, limited however, to shipments
moving on a through bill of lading and having an immediately prior
or subsequent movement by rail, and directed that a certificate in such
form be issued to R.E.A. As an apparent afterthought, R.E.A. requested that the words "or air" be added to the certificate following the
words "by rail," to cover the occasional movement of an air express
shipment, and the Commission complied. In each of these cases the
Commission adverted to the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a) but
held that it was not applicable, even though in the West Warwick Case
a distance of only twelve miles was involved. In none of these cases,
however, did the Commission make any effort to define the phrase
"incidental to transportation by aircraft" or to explain why it regarded
the proposed R.E.A. service for air express as a "line-haul" movement.
Commissioner Lee dissented on this point in the West Warwick Case
and in the Bristol Case, contending in both that the service proposed,
insofar as air express shipments were involved, was within the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a), but he likewise gave no reasons for his
position. Since only a trivial amount of air express traffic was involved
in these cases, and the Commission had already decided that a certificate
should be issued to the R.E.A. for the proposed service covering rail
express, the slight modification of the certificate to include air express,
as requested by the R.E.A., must have appeared to the majority of the
Commission as a harmless accommodation to R.E.A., particularly in
the absence of opposition by any party.
The foregoing considerations would appear to accord these R.E.A.
cases little, if any, precedent value with respect to the meaning ,and
scope of the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a). In any event, the Commission in its subsequent decisions has utterly disregarded them. In
the first case decided by the Commission involving Section 203 (b) (7a)
subsequent to the R.E.A. cases, 7 the Commission adverted to the West
Warwick Case, but dismissed it with the statement that "the circumstances which persuaded such a finding at that time are not present
here." A slight effort was made in that case to distinguish the West
Warwick Case on its facts; but in the fourteen or more cases subsequently decided by the Commission, involving Section 203 (b) (7a),
the R.E.A. cases were not even mentioned. Thus, the R.E.A. cases
should properly be disregarded as precedent reflecting on the scope of
Section 203 (b) (7a).
*

6

Railway Express Agency, Inc., Extension of Operations-West Warwick,
R.I., 31 MCC 332; -West Unity-Middletown, 31 MCC 363; -Providence-Bristol,
31 MCC 385; and -Clarksburg-Buckhannon.31 MCC 700.
7 Sky Freight Delivery Service, Inc., Common CarrierApplication, No. MC106028, 47 MCC 229 (1947).
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II.

CASES INVOLVING COMMERCIAL AIRLINE TRAFFIC TRANSPORTED BY
MOTOR CARRIERS UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE AIRLINES

Three types of commercial airline traffic are presently being transported by motor carriers under contract with the airlines: (1) at virtually every airport in the United States served by the commercial airlines under their "air freight" tariffs, motor transportation service for
air freight is offered by the airlines between such airport and points
within the designated "terminal area" of that airport; (2) under emergency circumstances all commercial airlines provide a substitute motor
carrier service for air service for all types of their traffic; and (3) at
five airports in the United States the commercial airlines under their
tariffs provide ground transportation for passengers between such airports and one or more points within the "terminal areas" of those airports. No cases have ever arisen before the Commission involving the
type of service described in (3), but in several cases the Commission

has considered the applicability of the exemption in Section 203
(b) (7a) to the types of service described in (1) and (2).
Motor Carrier Transportationas Regular Part of Airline
Air Freight Operations
All of the permanently certificated domestic airlines of the United

States are presently engaged in the transportation of "air freight." Although airlines have long been transporting property by air in conjunction with Railway Express Agency's air express service, the direct
entry of airlines into the freight transportation field is essentially a
postwar development, the first airline tariff offering to the public a
common carrier air freight service having been published on October
1, 1944.
In conjunction with the establishment of their air freight service,
the airlines recognized that adequate and efficient ground transportation service, coordinated with the air service, was essential if air freight
service was to be an effective instrumentality of commerce; and the
following statement by the Commission indicates that it is in complete
accord with the airlines on this point: 8
"The sale of air-line service depends to a considerable extent
upon the speed with which the lines are able to effect deliveries.
Any delay necessitated by the assembly or distribution of traffic
by ground transportation will naturally affect the time element
involved in the over-all service. In some instances, the time consumed in the movement of traffic by ground transportation will
closely approach, if not exceed, the time consumed in the line-haul
air movement. It is necessary, therefore, that the airlines have
available an expeditious motor-carrier service which will be available at all times to meet arriving or departing planes, so that a
minimum of time may be lost between the original pickup or ulti-

mate delivery."
8 Peoples Express Co., Extension of Operation, No. MC-1756 (Sub. No. 1),

48 MCC 393 at 395.
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Accordingly, each airline engaging in air freight activities has
undertaken to provide ground transportation service between the airports served and designated points within the "terminal areas" of
those airports, through contracts with local motor carrier operators.
The air freight shipment moves from the door of the consignor to
the door of the consignee under the airline's airbill (bill of lading).
The trucker accepts and delivers such shipments solely as the agent
of the airline; and the airline is responsible to the shipper for any
loss or damage."
In the Sky Freight Delivery Service Case 10 the Commission faced,
for the first time, the question of the extent to which a motor carrier,
transporting air freight under contract with an airline, was operating
within the exemption provision of Section 203 (b) (7a). The Commission summarily dismissed the Railway Express Agency cases as possible
precedents, and quite properly approached the Sky Freight Case as
one of first impression.
The applicant in the Sky Freight Case requested a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to transport shipments moving on
commercial airline or air express bills of lading between the airports
in the New York-Newark area, on the one hand, and points in New
York and northern New Jersey, on the other hand. The opinion of
the Commission contained the following findings of fact. The service
was being provided exclusively for American Airlines under a contract
with that airline. The motor carrier acted solely as agent for the
airline and performed in the name of the airline: The shipments at all
times moved under the airbill (bill of lading) of the airline. The
service was provided between La Guardia and Newark airports, on the
one hand, and all points within the "air freight terminal area" of the
airline as set forth in its tariffs, on the other hand. Five points in New
York and twenty-three points in New Jersey were included within such
"air freight terminal area," the most distant point in New York being
twenty-three miles from La Guardia Airport and the most distant point
in New Jersey being eight miles from Newark Airport. The contract
also provided for an expansion by the airline of such "terminal area"
to include points within forty-five miles of La Guardia Airport and
twenty-seven miles of Newark Airport.
The Commission first considered the meaning of the phrase "incidental to transportation by aircraft" as used in Section 203 (b) (7a).
Although general consideration had been given to that section by the
Commission in the R.E.A. cases, it had never previously undertaken to
define that particular phrase. Legislative history unfortunately could
offer no assistance, since Congress had not disclosed its intent or pur9 In May 1947, the airlines delegated to their wholly owned subsidiary, Air
Cargo, Inc., complete authority to act as their agent in arranging for, and supervising the operation of, such ground transportation service.
10 Supra note 7.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

pose in adding Section 203 (b) (7a) to the Act. Consequently, the
Commission elected to follow the dictionary definition of "incidental"
and concluded that, to be "incidental," the motor carrier transportation must be a "result of," and "adjunct of," and "subordinate to" the
movement by air. In support of this conclusion, the Commission referred to Sections 202 (c) (1) and (2) ,10a which were added to the Act
two years after Section 203 (b) (7a). In those sections Congress again
used the phrase "incidental," when referring to motor carrier service
rendered in conjunction with transportation by other forms of carriers,
but was more specific, in that the term "incidental" was limited expressly to pickup, delivery, and transfer service within the terminal
areas of the line-haul carriers. The Commission, in the Sky Freight
Case, indicated that the language in Section 202 (c) could probably be
regarded as a more artistic expression by Congress of the same general
concept it intended to convey in Section 203 (b) (7a). From the dictionary definition of "incidental" and the analogous, although later,
use of that term in Section 202 (c), the Commission drew the following
conclusion:
"... transportation in the performance of collection, delivery,
or interline transfer of air freight within what appears to be a
reasonable terminal area for the line-haul air carrier is 'incidental' to the transportation by air."
The Commission dismissed the application of Sky Freight upon
making the ultimate finding that the service proposed was within the
scope of the exemption provided in Section 203 (b) (7a) as thus defined. It should be noted in passing, however, that this definition does
not necessarily purport to be all-inclusive. Collection, delivery, and
transfer services within the airline's terminal area are held to be
"incidental to transportation by aircraft"; but the definition does not
indicate that the Commission intended thereby to exclude the possilea "(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or of section 303, the
provisions of this chapter, except the provisions of section 304 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and
equipment, shall not apply(1) to transportation by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad subject to
chapter 1 of this title, or by a water carrier subject to chapter 12 of this title,
or by a freight forwarder subject to chapter 13 of this title, incidental to transportation or service subject to such parts, in the performance within terminal
areas of transfer, collection, or delivery services; but such transportation shall
be considered to be and shall be regulated as transportation subject to chapter
1 of this title when performed by such carrier by railroad, as transportation subject to chapter 12 of this title when performed by such water carrier, and as
transportation or service subject to chapter 13 of this title when performed by
such freight forwarder;
(2) to transportation by motor vehicle by any person (whether as agent
or under a contractual arrangement) for a common carrier by railroad subject
to chapter 1 of this title, an express company subject to chapter 1 of this title,
a motor carrier subject to this chapter, a water-carrier subject to chapter 12
of this title, or a freight forwarder subject to chapter 13 of this title, in the
performance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery service; but
such transportation shall be considered to be performed by such carrier, express
company, or freight forwarder as part of, and shall be regulated in the same
manner as, the transportation by railroad, express, motor vehicle, or water, or
the freight forwarder transportation or service, to which such services are incidental." 56 Stat. 300, 49 U.S.C. 302.
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bility that other types of service may also be "incidental to transportation by aircraft" within the meaning of that phrase as used in Section
203 (b) (7a). Thus, for example, cases involving the "emergency" type
of service, discussed in the following subsection, were decided subsequent to the Sky Freight Case; and even though such service extended
far beyond the terminal area of the airport concerned, it was held by
the Commission to be "incidental" within the meaning of the exemption.
In the second case presented to the Commission involving the transportation of air freight by a motor carrier under contract with airlines,
again the application was for authority to provide motor transportation
for property moving on airline bills of lading between La Guardia and
Newark airports, on the one hand, and points in northern New Jersey,
within forty miles of the Newark Airport, on the other." Except for
the fact that the contractual arrangements with the airlines were oral,
rather than written, the facts of the Golembiewski Case were virtually
identical to those in the Sky Freight Case, and the Commission so
stated:
"The application before us is almost identical to that filed by
Sky Freight, supra. The maximum hauls involved in the Sky
Freight Case were approximately the same as those here proposed.
In that case, as here, shipments transported move in door-to-door
service at rates fixed by the airlines and under contracts between
applicants and the airlines. We find nothing in applicant's present
proposal to compel us to 12a different conclusion than was reached in
the Sky Freight Case."'
The Commission qualified its decision, however, by saying:
"Such consideration as door-to-door rates and air-carrier billing
and responsibility are not necessarily controlling and would not
require a finding of an exempt operation should it appear that the
motor-carrier service involved was so extensive as to constitute,
in fact, a line-haul part of a through interline service, rather than
a bona fide collection or delivery service incidental to air carrier
service."13
This admonition in the Golembiewski opinion soon found practical

application in the next case of this type to be decided by the Commission, Peoples Express Co., Extension of Operation.4 The nature of
the service proposed in the Peoples Express Case was found to be substantially the same as that proposed in the two preceding cases: the
application was limited to shipments moving on commercial airline or
air express bills of lading, the service was to be rendered for airlines
under contract, door-to-door airline rates would apply to the shipments,
and they would be covered throughout their movement by the airline
11 Sigmund J. Golembiewski, Common Carrier Application, No. MC-106850,
48 MCC 1 (1948).
12 48 MCC 1 at 4.
18

48 MCC 1 at 5.

14 Supra note 8.
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shipping document. The only distinguishing feature between the
PeoplesExpress Case and the two preceding cases was that the proposed
service was to be provided between the airports in or adjacent to New
York and Newark, on the one hand, and all points in the entire State
of New Jersey, on the other hand.
On the issue of the applicability of Section 203 (b) (7a) to this proposed service, the Commission concluded that service within such portion of the area involved as duplicated the Sky Freightproposal would
be within the exemption; but it went on to point out that certain of
the points to be served were more than one hundred miles distant
from the Newark Airport and actually were in the immediate vicinity
of the Philadelphia Airport at which the same type of air service was
available. Based on such findings the Commission reached the following important conclusion:
"Motor operations conducted as those proposed which extend so
far as to reach into the territory adjacent to, and served primarily
by, another airport clearly take on the character of inter-terminal
line-haul service in substitution for, rather than incidental to, air

transportation."

(Emphasis added.)15
The Commission found that the public convenience and necessity
required the service proposed in the Peoples Express application; and
rather than attempting to draw a line between that portion which was
exempt under Section 203 (b) (7a) and that which was not, the Commission decided to issue a certificate for the entire operation.
The Peoples Express Case decision thus provides a significant corollary to the definition of "incidental to transportation by aircraft" in
the Sky Freight Case, by establishing an important category of service
which will not be regarded as service within "a reasonable terminal
area for the line-haul air carrier" and hence exempt under Section
203 (b) (7a), namely, motor carrier service which extends into the terminal area of another airport at which like air service is available.
The other two cases of this type decided by the Commission are the
Harry Lillien Case 16 and the Hazel Kenny Case.1 7 The former is an
unreported case involving a motor carrier providing transportation of
property in the New York and nearby Connecticut area for the Belgian
airline, Sabena, under contract with that airline. The service was held
to be within the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a) on the authority
of the Sky Freight Case. The latter case involved an application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by a motor carrier providing pickup and delivery service for air freight in the Pittsburgh
area under contract with Capital Airlines. The application requested
authority to provide such service to all points within a fifty-mile radius
of the airports in Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), although at that
15 48 MCC 393 at 396.
16 Harry Lillien, Common Carrier Application, No. MC-108665, unreported.
17 Hazel Kenny Extension-Air Freight, No. MC-5485 (Sub. No. 1), '49 MCC
182 (1949).
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time (and at present) Capital Airlines and the other airlines serving
Pittsburgh were (and are) providing pickup and 'delivery service
under their tariffs only within Pittsburgh and its immediately adjacent
suburbs. In analyzing the area within the fifty-mile radius contemplated for service by the Kenny application, the Commission stated:
"Within this radius Pittsburgh is the largest point in size and
within Pittsburgh and a small area therearound is concentrated the
greatest density of population for such radius. The radius also
embraces some mountainous territory within which principal air
terminals are not likely to be located. Shippers on the perimeter of
the radius are desirous of air service. That they seek an expeditious movement of their traffic by air is evident from their practice of not engaging line-haul motor carriers to transport their
freight to and from the airports. Because of this the air carriers
are handicapped in attracting more freight from these points when
they do not have an agent to perform the incidental ground haul.
We conclude that points within a 50-mile radius of either of the
two above-described airports in Allegheny County are within the
terminal areas of air carriers operating to and from such airports,
and that bona fide collection, delivery, and transfer operations on
behalf of air carriers serving such airports in the transportation of
commodities having an immediately prior or subsequent movement
by aircraft and moving on commercial air line or air express bills
of lading are incidental to transportation by aircraft and are exempt from the certificate and permit requirements of the act."' 8
Based on such findings, the Commission dismissed the application.
On its face the Kenny decision would appear to be the broadest interpretation to date by the Commission with respect to the scope of the
Section 203 (b) (7a) exemption. Actually, however, such is not the
case. It should be noted that the Commission qualified its decision in
the Kenny Case by providing that such traffic must be moving on commercial airline or express bills of lading. Since an airline or air express
bill of lading may be issued only in conformance with a tariff published
by the airline or the Railway Express Agency and filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and no such tariff had been so filed, the Commission was not in fact authorizing Kenny to provide the proposed service
within the fifty-mile radius contemplated by the application. In effect,
the Commission merely held that if a commercial airline should publish a tariff providing pickup and delivery service to points fifty miles
distant from the Pittsburgh airport and should contract with Kenny
to perform the actual operation for the airline, such operation by
Kenny would then be within the exemption.
The qualification that shipments must be "moving on commercial
airline or air express bills of lading" appears in every decision of the
Commission in which it has held that ground service provided for air
freight by motor carriersunder contract with the airlines is within the
exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a). The significance of this qualification may not be readily apparent; but what it in effect represents is a
18

49 MCC 182 at 185.
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reliance by the Commission upon the fact that air freight moving in
motor carrier service under airline bills of lading must necessarily be
moving under the airline tariffs and under airline contracts with the
motor carriers, and such movements cannot take place without the
sanction of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 19 Thus, the Commission in
these cases is actually saying that if such movement is approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board it will be approved by the Commission.
The Commission, in deciding the foregoing cases, has unquestionably exercised sound administrative judgment and acted in a manner
consistent with the apparent intent of Congress by according almost
conclusive weight to those very factors which place such motor transportation squarely under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, namely, that such services are provided pursuant to contracts
between the airlines and the motor carriers and the fact that such services are offered to the public as services of the airlines under their tariffs, shipping documents, and responsibility. Although the Commission,
of course, has the primary duty of construing the scope of the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a), the serious repercussions of such interpretations are felt mainly by the air transport industry; since air transportation is utterly reliant upon motor carrier transportation for the
local movement of airline traffic to and from the airports. Thus, it is
most appropriate that the Commission has afforded the Board the
initial opportunity to regulate the nature and extent of such service.
At first blush, the Commission's decision in the Peoples Express
Case, supra, in which it refused to extend the exemption of Section
203 (b) (7a) to include motor transportation of air freight moving
under airline contracts and shipping documents from Newark Airport
to the very limits of Philadelphia, might possibly appear to be a contradiction of, or at least inconsistent with, the principles above indicated.
Actually, however, such apparently exceptional action by the Commission was quite proper, and created no conflict with the Civil Aeronautics Board, since the Board had never given its sanction to such
operations. The air carriers with whom Peoples Express had its contracts, and for whom it was acting, were not certificated airlines and
were operating under a temporary exemption which relieved them
from filing tariffs and contracts. Such exemption, a holdover from
prewar conditions, has long since been abolished; and now all air
freight carriers, as well as the scheduled airlines, are fully subject to
19 The specific sections of the Civil Aeronautics Act under which the Board
exercises full regulatory control over such contracts and services are the following: Section 412(a) which requires every air carrier to file with the Board
a copy of every contract affecting air transportation between such air carrier
and any other carrier for cooperative working arrangements; Section 412(b)
which requires the Board to disapprove such contract if it shall find it to be
adverse to the public interest, otherwise to approve it; Section 403(a) which
requires the air carriers to publish in their tariffs all services which they provide
in connection with air transportation; Section 403(b) which prohibits an air
carrier from providing a service not so published in its tariff; and Section 1002 (g)
which authorizes the Board to suspend the publication of any tariff provision
pending hearing and decision with respect to its lawfulness.
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the aforementioned tariff and contract provisions, Sections 403 and 412
of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Motor CarrierService Provided Under Contract With Airlines as
Emergency Substitute for Air Service
Airlines provide service to points which they are authorized to
serve through airports approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Such
approval includes not only the airport regularly used for such services,
but also airports to be used under emergency conditions when the airport regularly used is unavailable. Unfavorable weather conditions are,
of course, the usual reason for utilization of an alternate airport. In
the Graff and Blue Bird cases, 20 the motor carrier operators, who were
regularly engaged in transporting airline passengers between the Baltimore Municipal Airport and Baltimore, and between the Chicago Municipal Airport and Chicago, respectively, applied to the Commission
for appropriate authority to transport such passengers between each of
those cities and the alternate airport used when the Baltimore and
Chicago municipal airports were unavailable. In the Graff Case the
usual alternate was the airport at Washington, D.C., and in the Blue
Bird Case the usual alternate was the airport at Milwaukee.
The Commission decided in both cases that such emergency service,
although clearly rendered beyond what could conceivably be regarded
as the "terminal areas" of the Chicago and Baltimore airports and unquestionably "line-haul" motor carrier operation in character, was
nevertheless "incidental to transportation by aircraft" within the meaning of the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a). The Commission specifically stated that cases previously decided by it involving regular, as
distinguished from emergency, service were not precedents for deciding
these two cases, and spelled out the following principles for cases of
this type:
"Connecting-carrier line-haul motor operations are complement-

ary to air transportation services with which they connect and are
conducted regularly as a part of through interline service. In contrast the operations here involved, though line-haul, are sporadic
and irregular in point of time and emergency in character. They

are furnished at the airline's expense and serve as a substitute for
impossible or impracticable air transportation and not as a complement to regular air service. They are clearly subordinate to the
regular air service; a necessary result or adjunct of it, without
which, or its equivalent in some form, maintenance of regular air
service would be'21more hazardous if not wholly impracticable on
many occasions."

The logic and soundness of this decision is indisputable, and ex-

tended discussion could add nothing.
20

Theodore Graff, Common CarrierApplication, No. MC-108218, 48 MCC 310

(1948); Blue Bird Air Service, Contract Carrier Application, No. MC-107420,

48 MCC 310 (1948).
21 49 MCC 310 at 315-316.
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III.

CASES INVOLVING COMMERCIAL AIRLINE TRAFFIC TRANSPORTED BY
MOTOR CARRIERS OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE

AIRLINES

The third category of cases before the Commission involving Section 203 (b) (7a) concerns airline traffic transported to and from airports by motor carriers who do not operate under contract with the
airlines and do not carry passengers or property for the airlines or
under airline tickets or shipping documents.
General ConsiderationsAffecting the Commission's Treatment of Cases
in This Category
The exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a), in contradistinction to the
exemption in Section 202 (c) (2), is not limited to incidental transportation performed by a person acting "as agent or under a contractual
arrangement" with the line-haul carrier. The exemption in Section
203 (b) (7a) requires only that the motor carrier transportation be
"incidental to transportation by aircraft." It is therefore evident that
motor carrier operators may, within certain limits, engage in providing
"incidental" ground transportation for airline traffic independently of
the airlines; and the Commission has so recognized in the cases to be
discussed in this section.
For economic or other reasons, the airlines do not, except in a very
few instances, provide motor carrier transportation for airline passengers locally to and from the airports, nor do they provide air freight
pickup and delivery service for all points which may regularly receive
air service through a particular airport. Independent motor carrier
operators have entered the field to fill these gaps; and also to compete
at certain points with the motor carrier service actually provided by
the airlines.
Since such service is provided by independent motor carrier operators and not by the airlines, the Commission, in determining whether
that service is within the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a) , cannot rely
on the factors regarded as so significant in the preceding category of
cases, namely, airline contracts and tariffs and the concurrent jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Since these services are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board,
and a finding by the Commission that such service is within the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a) would free such motor carrier operations
from all Federal regulatory authority, it would appear appropriate for
the Commission to adopt a more conservative and critical approach in
considering these cases than in considering cases involving service
under airline contracts and tariffs which are also subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Board; and the Commission has, in fact,
taken just such an attitude in several of these cases.
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Analysis of Commission Decisions in Cases Involving Independent
Motor Carrier Operators
The first case under Section 203 (b) (7a) involving this type of
service was the Seattle Transfer Company Case.22 An application was
filed for a certificate authorizing the transportation of property between the City of Seattle and ihe Seattle-Tacoma Airport, through
which United Air Lines served Seattle. The case was submitted to a
joint board, and the recommendation of the joint board became the
decision of the Commission by operation of statute. The opinion does
not indicate that the service was one provided under contract with
the airline or that the shipments moved in ground transportation under
airline shipping documents. On the authority of the Port Columbus
Case, supra, it was held that such motor carrier transportation for
property which has had or will have a prior or subsequent movement
by aircraft was within the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a).
The Commission itself first considered this type of operation in the
Air FreightDelivery Service Co. Case,23 which was decided in conjunction with the Sky Freight Case. The application of Air Freight was for
a certificate authorizing the transportation by motor carrier of air
freight between the Newark Airport and points in the commercial
zone of New York City, which does not include Newark. The findings
of fact indicated that Air Freight was rendering such service for the
account of seventy shippers and in addition served several airlines;
but the airline service apparently was not under contract, 'although
the Commission indicated that such contracts were contemplated. In
its discussion and in drawing its conclusions, the Commission treated
both the Sky Freight and the Air Freight applications together, and
found them both to be within the exemption. The Air Freight application appears actually to have presented the Commission with a considerably narrower and simpler issue than that raised by the Sky Freight
application. This latter application involved both the Newark and
La Guardia airports and all points named in American Airlines' terminal area tariff, which covered numerous points in both New York
and New Jersey in the areas surrounding those airports; whereas, the
Air Freight application was limited solely to service between the Newark Airport and points in the New York City commercial zone. The
holding that the Air Freight application involved exempt service therefore appears to have been governed solely by the fact that the Newark
Airport is one of the airports regularly used by the airlines in providing
service to and from the New York City area.
In the Teterboro Motor TransportationCase,2 4 the Teterboro Company applied for authority to transport airline passengers between
22

Seattle Transfer Co. Extension-Seattle-Tacoma Airport, No. MC-67020,

6 Fed. Car. Cas. 154 (1947), 47 MCC 1064.
23 Air FreightDelivery Service, Inc., Common CarrierApplication. No. MC106730, 47 MCC 229 (1947).
24 Teterboro Motor Trans. Inc., Common CarrierApplication, No. MC-106283,
47 MCC 247 (1947).
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Bendix Airport at Teterboro, New Jersey and New York City and
between that airport and points in New Jersey within twenty-five miles
of the airport. This operation was to be conducted independently of the
airlines. The Commission held that the proposal, insofar as New Jersey
points were concerned, met the requirement established in the Sky
Freight Case that the traffic carried "must as a prerequisite have an immediately prior or subsequent movement by aircraft" and further held
that the Newark Airport could reasonably be considered as the airport
intended to serve points in New Jersey within a twenty-five mile radius
thereof. On the basis of these findings the proposed service to the
New Jersey points was held exempt; but because the operation to New
York City would include other than airline passengers, a certificate
was issued for such operation.
In the Peter Picknelly Case,25 an application was filed by Picknelly
for authority to transport airline traffic between Springfield, Massachusetts and Bradley Field, at Windsor Locks, Connecticut, a distance
of thirteen miles, including such service at the intermediate points
en route, Agawam, Massachusetts, and Suffield, Connecticut. Both
United and Eastern Air Lines testified that they proposed in the immediate future to use Bradley Field in providing service for Springfield, but Picknelly's service was not to be under contract with the airlines. The Commission found Picknelly's proposed service to be within
the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a). The significant findings supporting this conclusion are the following:
"It accordingly becomes necessary merely to determine whether
the transportation to be performed will constitute a line-haul movement. We do not believe that it will. Springfield is but thirteen miles
from the airport in question, not an undue distance for an out-of-

town airport,and the intervening area is sparsely settled. It is apparent that the operations here considered are in fact delivery service from and to the airport and Springfield, and are designed for the
use of passengers of airlines whose services are essentially services

to and from the Springfield area. '26 (Emphasis added.)
A situation similar to the Peter Picknelly Case was presented in the
Atterholt Case.27 A certificate was requested authorizing independent
motor carrier service for airline traffic between the Youngstown Airport

and Youngstown, Warren, Sharon, and other points in Mercer County,
Pennsylvania. The Commission found such service to be within Section 203 (b) (7a), holding:
"Youngstown, Warren, and Sharon form the three corners of an
equilateral triangle. Vienna, adjacent to which is the airport, is
located between Sharon and Warren on the side of the triangle
opposite Youngstown, so that it appears to be about as close, possibly closer, to Sharon than it is to Youngstown. Obviously it serves
the area. Although the proposed hauls are somewhat longer than
25 Peter Picknelly, Extension of Operations, No. MC-61016 (Sub. No. 7)
47 MCC 401 (1947).
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47 MCC 401 at 405.

27 James & Eliz. Atterholt, Common Carrier Application, No. MC-108176,
7 Fed. Car. Cas. 178 (1949).
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might be expected in this area we are convinced that the record
shows a proposal to engage in operations which are incidental to
transportation by aircraft and within the exemption provided by

Section 203(b) (7a) ."28

(Emphasis added.)

Likewise, in the Hudgins Case,2 9 an application for authority to
transport air freight between the airports within fifteen miles of Dallas
and Fort Worth, on the one hand, and both Dallas and Fort Worth on
the other hand, was filed with the Commission by an independent
motor carrier. In holding that such service was within the exemption,
although hauls up to forty-five miles may be involved, the Commission
stated that it so found, among other reasons, "because the airports
involved are designed for service to and from both Dallas and Fort
Worth, including the metropolitan areas of each."
But not all cases decided by the Commission under this category
involved findings that the proposed service was within the exemption
of Section 203 (b) (7a). Just as in the Peoples Express Case,30 the
Commission placed a limit on the scope of such service when rendered
under airline contract, so, in the Bruce Koch Case,31 the Commission
placed a limit on service rendered by independent motor carriers. In
the Bruce Koch Case, an application was filed by an independent motor
carrier for authority to transport air freight for shippers and consignees
between the Vandalia airport, on the one hand, and Dayton (ten miles
south), Springfield (twenty-four miles east), Sidney (thirty-two miles
north), and Richmond (forty miles west). In holding that the service
within the exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a) was limited to that in
the vicinity of Vandalia and Dayton and points within the commercial
zone of Dayton, the Commission stated:
"The mere fact that the proposal involved is restricted to
traffic having an immediately prior or subsequent movement by air
is not enough, standing alone, to require the conclusion that the
proposed motor service is subject to the partial exemption. Some
of it, the portion confined to the immediate vicinity of Vandalia no
doubt is exempt. Also the operations to and from Dayton and points
in the Dayton commercial zone appear to be exempt, the Vandalia
airport being known, as above indicated, as the Dayton Municipal
Airport. Beyond this we cannot go. Available maps indicate a
number of airports as close or closer than the Vandalia airport to
Springfield, Sidney, and Richmond. There is no showing that the
Vandalia airport is the airport normally or regularly used in supply'32
ing air service to and from these three points or any of them.
In the Air Terminal Facilities of California Case,88 on the other
hand, an independent motor carrier filed an application to provide
28 7 Fed. Car. Cas. 178 at 179.
29 W. P. Hudgins, Contract CarrierApplication, No. MC-109237 (Sub. No. 1),
7 Fed. Car. Cas. 168 (1949).

80 Supra note 8.

31 Bruce C. Koch, Common CarrierApplication, No. MC-108663, 49 MC
(1949
MCC 555 at 557.
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83 Air Terminal Facilities of California, Common Carrir Application, No.
MC-109626 (1949), unreported.
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motor carrier transportation for air freight to points within a fifty-mile
radius surrounding the Los Angeles Municipal Airport and to points
within a seventy-five mile radius of the San Francisco and Oakland
airports, although evidence at the hearing indicated that the bulk of
such service was currently being performed within thirty miles of
such airports. The Commission found, on the basis of the facts of
the record, that the San Francisco Municipal Airport, the Oakland
Municipal Airport, and the Los Angeles Airport were ". . . the only
airports in these areas which can be, and are used by the regular
commercial airlines. They are obviously the airports designed for
service to and from the points in the respective areas . . ." On the
basis of such finding it held that the proposed service was within .the
exemption of Section 203 (b) (7a)
Conclusions With Respect to Independent Motor CarrierService for
Airline Traffic
In applying the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a) to ground transportation of air traffic provided by motor carriers operating independently of the airlines, the Commission has very properly approached
such cases cautiously and critically, since a finding that such service is
exempt would leave such service free from any Federal regulatory
authority. In none of these cases, of course, does the Commission impose the limitation that the shipments must be moving on commercial
airline or air express bills of lading, for it is obvious that such shipments could not be so moving when the motor carrier is operating
independently of the airlines. The only restriction which the Commission does place in its decisions, which find such service to be within
the exemption, is that the shipment or person carried must have an immediately prior or subsequent movement by aircraft. The only relevant fact- upon which the Commission may rely in making its decision,
when such service is not offered by the airline itself, are thus limited
to the nature of the actual movement of airline traffic and the geographical relationship between the particular points involved. The
criteria which have emerged from these decisions is that the airport
concerned must not only be used regularly by the airlines for receiving
and delivering traffic originating at or destined to the cities and towns
included within the motor carrier service pattern, but such airport
must also be clearly designed to provide such service. These considerations obviously present a more difficult problem to the Commission
than when the service is provided under an airline tariff and pursuant
to an airline contract, both of which are subject to Civil Aeronautics
Board authority; and in the last analysis the question comes down
almost entirely to a matter of the exercise of reasonable judgment and
discretion by the Commission.
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SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSION

When Congress, by Section 1107 (j) of the Civil Aeronatics Act of
1938, amended Section 203 (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act to
create an exemption for motor carrier transportation incidental to
transportation by aircraft, it offered no clue as to the meaning of the
term "incidental" as so used. Since the exemption is, in effect, a limitation on the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission over
such operations, the Commission had the primary duty of construing
the scope of such exemption. The cases which have arisen before the
Commission involving this exemption fall into two distinct categories,
prewar cases and postwar cases. The prewar cases were concerned
solely with the air express traffic of the Railway Express Agency; and
the Commission, without endeavoring to analyze or define the exemption, held that local motor transportation of such traffic for the Express
Agency should be certificated along with the Express Agency's rail
express rights. These cases have been distinguished, and probably may
be regarded as over-ruled, by the postwar cases; and in any event they
have been totally disregarded by the Commission in its many postwar
decisions involving this question.
The postwar cases before the Commission involving Section 203
(b) (7a) have been concerned with motor carrier ground transportation of both air passengers and air freight. The Commission has held,
with only one readily distinguishable exception, that when such
services are provided under the airline tariffs by motor carriers under
contract with the airlines, and are'thus under Civil Aeronautics Board
control, they fall within the exemption. On the other hand, when such
services are rendered by motor carriers operating independently of
the airlines, with the result that the Civil Aeronautics Board has no
control over such operations, the Commission critically examines the
area of proposed services; and only if the airport concerned is regularly
used by the airlines and such airport is clearly intended to serve the
town to which the motor carrier proposes service, will such operation
be held to be within the exemption.
The principles thus developed and applied by the Commission in
the numerous cases which have been presented to it involving an interpretation of Section 203 (b) (7a) appear to be consistent with Congressional intent and with sound administrative practice. The airlines
have taken no issue with the Commission with respect to these decisions, and have developed their pattern of ground transportation for
airline traffic within the framework of the principles thus enunciated;
and although the line-haul motor carriers apparently are somewhat
fearful that such exempt motor carrier transportation might someday
invade their certificate rights, to date no line-haul motor carrier has
been able to demonstrate to the Commission that its construction and
application of the exemption in Section 203 (b) (7a) has produced any
harmful effects on the motor carrier industry.

